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I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS ARTICLE SURVEYS the highlights of aviation-related
liability litigation pending in United States courts in 2014.
The authors' intent is to present a blend of prominent decisions
which are interesting, controversial, and/or potentially trendset-
ting. Where appropriate, the authors have provided editorial
content. However, the goal of this article is to provide an objec-
tive recital of recent aviation decisions for the benefit of the avi-
ation practitioner.
2014 was a year in which aviation in all its applications-com-
mercial airlines, general aviation, military operations, hobby air-
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craft, even suborbital spacecraft-were prominently featured in
the public consciousness. The various causes of this notoriety
were, let it be said, by and large inadvertent, and were mostly
tragic. Worldwide newspaper headlines beyond counting, and
television hours in the thousands, documented disasters involv-
ing two Malaysia Airlines flights.' In Buffalo, New York, the
claims of three persons (including a fatality) arising out of the
February 12, 2009 crash of a commuter plane (Continental Con-
nection Flight 3407) commenced trial in September, 2014, cap-
tivating that community for many weeks.2 The New Year brought
still more tragic news involving an AirAsia airliner. And, when
airline disasters were not grabbing headlines, unmanned air-
craft systems were.
Of course, there is a lag between the occurrence of accidents
and incidents and the judicial decisions stemming from related
litigation. Therefore, one can reasonably expect that the impact
of 2014's eventful "aviation year" will be felt throughout our
court system for years to come. That said, a few of these topics
1 On March 8, 2014, Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 departed from Kuala Lumpur
International Airport at 12:41 a.m. Malaysia Standard Time. The Boeing 777 was
scheduled to land at Beijing Capital International Airport at 6:30 a.m. China
Standard Time, on March 8. On board were 227 passengers and twelve
crewmembers. Less than one hour into the flight, contact with Flight 370 was lost
and was never reestablished. The aircraft was neither seen nor heard from again.
A massive search of land and sea turned up neither wreckage nor any remnants.
Missing Malaysia Plane MH340: What We Know, BBC NEws ASIA, www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-26503141 (last updated Jan. 30, 2015). On January 29, 2015, the
Malaysian government declared MH370 to be an "accident" and all on board
were presumed dead. Keith Bradsher, Loss of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 Is Declared
an Accident, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/30/
world/asia/malaysia-declares-loss-of-flight-370-in-march-an-accident.html?_r=0.
On July 17, 2014, MH17 (a Boeing 777) was en route at high altitude from Am-
sterdam to Kuala Lumpur when it crashed with 283 passengers on board in east-
ern Ukraine, a conflict-stricken territory. MH1 7 Malaysia Plane Crash in Ukraine:
What We Know, BBC NEWS EUROPE, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-283
57880 (last updated Sept. 9, 2014).
2 Trial Begins in Case of Commuter Plane That Crashed Into Home Near Buffalo, CBS
NEW YORK (Sept. 18, 2014, 3:13 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2014/09/18/
trial-begins-in-case-of-commuter-plane-that-crashed-into-home-near-buffalo/.
3 Flight QZ8501: What We Know About the AirAsia Plane Crash, BBC NEWS AsIA,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30632735 (last updated Jan. 20, 2015).
"The Airbus A320-200, carrying 162 people from Surabaya in Indonesia to Singa-
pore, was just over 40 minutes into its flight when contact was lost during bad
weather. The Indonesian Transport Minister said the plane had climbed at an
abnormally high speed before stalling. Wreckage and bodies were recovered
floating some 16km (10 miles) from the plane's last known co-ordinates."
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have already registered on the 2014 liability litigation landscape
and are discussed herein.
Setting "breaking news" to one side, 2014 saw a fair number of
cases in which courts continued to wrestle with the scope and
application of federal preemption of state law, including express
preemption, implied preemption, ordinary preemption, and
standard of care preemption.4 This is nothing new. As the cases
discussed herein demonstrate, there is something less than uni-
formity in the way that the federal courts approach the challeng-
ing issue of preemption.
Among the other relatively common issues that continued to
blossom throughout 2014 are the Montreal Convention,' the
Warsaw Convention,6 and the Federal Tort Claims Act,7 along
with forum non conveniens,8 personal jurisdiction,9 and conflict
of laws.' ° 2014 most likely saw the last of the issues arising out of
Flight 3407 to be adjudicated, but the litigation arising out of
the crash of Asiana Flight 214 in San Francisco in July, 2013, is
most likely just beginning to impact the legal landscape. 1
This article is not intended to be an all-encompassing capture
of every category of aviation cases; rather, it is a curated collec-
tion of 2014 decisions which the authors hope will guide the
reader in the year ahead.
II. DISCUSSION OF CASES
A. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
1. Ventress v. Japan Airlines
In Ventress v. Japan Airlines, the issue was whether the Federal
Aviation Act (the Act) preempts a statutory and common-law re-
taliation (whistleblower) and constructive termination claim.12
Since there is no express preemption of such a claim found in
the Act, one must find implied preemption, if any.13 Martin Ven-
tress, a flight engineer, alleged that Japan Airlines (JAL) "sub-
4 See infra text accompanying notes 12-109.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 110-96.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 197-207.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 271-300.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 208-18.
9 See infra text accompanying notes 343-440.
1o See infra text accompanying notes 327-42.
l1 See infra text accompanying notes 229-49.




jected him to unnecessary psychiatric evaluations and prevented
him from working because he raised . . . safety concerns and
submitted two safety reports to several federal agencies" regard-
ing a fellow pilot's medical fitness. 4
The procedural history of the case spans more than ten years,
but for purposes of this report, it suffices to note that the district
court granted judgment on the pleadings to JAL.15 On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed based on its conclusion that the Act
impliedly preempts Ventress's retaliation and constructive ter-
mination claims-but not necessarily all such claims brought
under California law. 16
The court first surveyed cases in which the preemptive scope
of the Act had been examined. It compared "claims based on
the airline crew's failure to warn passengers about blood clots" 7
(which are found to be preempted due to pervasive regulations)
with a routine tort claim involving aircraft stairs"' (which is not
preempted by federal law). Looking at the determination ofJAL
concerning the fitness of Ventress to fly (indeed, the gravamen
of the claim), the appellate court noted, "[o]ur review of the
applicable [Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR or FARS)] con-
firms that pilot qualifications and medical standards for airmen,
unlike aircraft stairs, are pervasively regulated." 9 "[Bly inviting
the factfinder to pass on questions of pilot qualification and
medical fitness, Ventress's state law claims impinge on Con-
gress's goal of ensuring 'a single, uniform system for regulating
aviation safety.' ",20 The court added,
In reaching this conclusion, we need not, and do not, suggest
that the [Act] preempts all retaliation and constructive termina-
tion claims brought under California law. Indeed, we recognize
that Congress has not occupied the field of employment law in
the aviation context and that the [Act] does not confer upon the
agency the exclusive power to regulate all employment matters
involving airmen. Instead, we hold that federal law preempts
state law claims that encroach upon, supplement, or alter the
federally occupied field of aviation safety and present an obstacle
14 Id. at 719-20.
15 Id. at 720.
16 Id. at 721-24.
17 Id. at 721 (discussing Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464 (9th Cir.
2007)).
18 Id. (discussing Martin v. Midwest Express Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806 (9th
Cir. 2009)).
19 Id. at 721.
20 Id. at 722 (quoting Montalvo, 508 F.3d at 471).
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to the accomplishment of Congress's legislative goal to create a
single, uniform system of regulating that field. 21
2. Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp.
For the second year running, Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive
Corp.2 2 appears in "Recent Developments in Aviation Law. "23
Filed in 2007, by 2014 this product liability action arising out of
the crash of a Cessna 172N had been whittled down to the plain-
tiffs 24 claims of negligence and strict liability asserted against a
single defendant, AVCO Corporation's Lycoming Engine Divi-
sion (Lycoming), as they relate to an engine overhaul in 2004.25
With trial approaching in late 2013, the district court "found
itself 'without sufficient guidance from either precedent or the
parties as to the law that will govern not only the jury's delibera-
tions, but also the Court's ruling on the relevance of evidence,
motions . . . and other questions.' ",26 What admittedly "vexed"
the district court was the treatment of Pennsylvania law in
the Third Circuit, its district courts, and Pennsylvania's state
courts, pertaining to strict product liability,27 and also federal
21 Id. at 722-23.
22 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 45 F. Supp. 3d 431 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
23 Jared L. Watkins & Evan Katin-Borland, Recent Developments in Aviation Law,
79J. AIR LAW & COMM. 215, 243-47.
24 The "plaintiff is Jill Sikkelee, individually and as personal representative of
the estate of David Sikkelee," to whom the plaintiff was married when he died in
the subject crash in 2005. Sikkelee, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 434.
25 The particularly convoluted procedural history of this case is mapped with
clarity in the "Background" segment of the district court's lengthy opinion. Id. at
434-38. The instant decision can appropriately be referred to as Sikkelee III.
26 Id. at 438.
27 At the time, Sikkelee III was under consideration, there was considerable un-
certainty as to whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts or would continue in its application of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. The confusion has since been cleared up to a considerable
extent, as the Pennsylvania High Court published its decision on November 19,
2014, in the matter Tinchner v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 343 (Pa. 2014). In
Tinchner, allocator was granted on the question of whether the Court "should
replace the strict liability analysis of § 402A of the Second Restatement with the
analysis of the Third Restatement ... [and] whether, if the Court were to adopt
the Third Restatement, that holding should be applied prospectively or retroac-
tively." Id. at 344. The Court ultimately held, inter alia, "[t]o the extent relevant
here, we decline to adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability
§§ 1 et seq., albeit appreciation of certain principles contained in that Restate-
ment has certainly informed our consideration of the proper approach to strict
liability in Pennsylvania .... Id. at 335.
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(regulatory) law pertaining to the negligence standard of
care.
28
While the district court's lengthy decision covers a variety of
interesting issues including law of the case and judicial estoppel,
to name but two, readers of this article will likely find the discus-
sion of implied field preemption to be especially germane.
The starting point for this analysis is the Abdullah decision.
Abdullah established implied federal field preemption with re-
gard to aviation safety as the law in the Third Circuit.29 However,
Abdullah dealt with "aircraft operations" 30 (the claim involved an
episode of in-flight turbulence), whereas Sikkelee does not; it is a
product design case. 31 On this point, the court noted that the
general standard of care found in 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 is not appli-
cable to an engine designer such as Lycoming 2 But this conclu-
sion merely called the question as to what federal standard of
care applies to the design and manufacture of aircraft. With
§ 91.13's general "careless or reckless" standard inapplicable,
with the creation of a federal common law "not viewed as an
option," and with the use of state common law as a gap filler
deemed "anathema to the very notion that the field is pre-
empted," the court was left to ponder.3 3 Specific federal aviation
regulations would apply where they exist-that much makes
abundant sense. But as to matters for which there are no specific
FARS, where there is a "gap" in the regulatory scheme-what to
do then? It is on this latter point that the legacy of Sikkelee III
may ultimately rest.
The court noted that Sikkelee is incorrect when she suggests
that "there can be no pervasive regulation of the field of aviation
safety, thus preempting the field from state regulation, if there
28 The source of confusion-or vexation, to more closely track the language of
DistrictJudge Brann-was the application of the venerable decision of the Third
Circuit in Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999), in which the ap-
pellate court held "that federal law establishes the applicable standards of care in
the field of air safety, generally, thus preempting the entire field from state and
territorial regulation." Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 367.
29 Sikkelee, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 446-47.
30 Abdullah, 181 F.3d 363.
31 Sikkelee, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 434.
32 The court in Sikkelee III rejected the arguments made by plaintiff "that Abdul-
lah implies the general principle that aircraft engine designers should not act
carelessly or recklessly, even where no specific federal regulation governs their
conduct, and that if the Court finds that 'no general or specific regulation'
reaches Lycoming's allegedly tortious conduct, then 'Lycoming is not immune
... there would simply be no preemption."' Sikkelee, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 446.
33 Id. at 450.
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are no regulations applicable to Lycoming's aircraft engine de-
sign. '34 More pointedly, "[t]he Court will measure Lycoming's
allegedly tortious conduct against the specific federal regula-
tions that Sikkelee asserts are applicable; if there is no genuine
issue as to whether Lycoming violated the specific regulations,
then summary judgment in Lycoming's favor is warranted. 3 5
And, if there is no specific federal regulation applicable?
"[W]here Congress determines that common law tort claims
should play no role in a regulatory scheme, preemption may
leave an injured person remediless."36
The court having determined that specific regulations will fix
the standard of care, the plaintiff asserted that Lycoming vio-
lated certain Civil Aviation Regulations (predecessors to the
Federal Aviation Regulations) with regard to the design and
construction of the reciprocating engine. 7 However, the court
in Sikkelee III observed, "[i]n tension with Sikkelee's assertion
that Lycoming has violated these provisions, the [Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA)]'s issuance of a type certificate for
the [subject engine] in 1966 denotes the Administrator's find-
ing that the engine met all applicable requirements."3 "Accord-
ingly, [the] Court holds that the Administrator's issuance of a
type certificate.., is conclusive of the engine's compliance with
the design and construction regulations. Lycoming's motion for
summary judgment on Sikkelee's claims predicated on the viola-
tion of these regulations should be granted."39 (Plaintiffs claims
on the theory that Lycoming violated its duty to report engine
defects to the FAA survived dismissal.)4"
3. Psalmond v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
Psalmond v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. arose out of an emergency
evacuation from a Delta Air Lines (Delta) flight from Atlanta to
Los Angeles in 2011."' After passengers heard a loud noise and
noticed flames coming out of the left engine, the pilot returned
34 Id. at 443-44 (internal brackets omitted).
35 Id. at 451.
36 Id. at 450 (referencing Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261
(2012)).
37 Id. at 443.
38 Id. at 452.
39 Id. at 456.
40 Id. at 456-60.
41 Psalmond v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 13-2327, 2014 WL 1232149, at *1
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 2014).
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to the Atlanta airport, where the plane landed without inci-
dent.4 2 Evacuation slides were deployed and the passengers were
instructed to exit via the slides." Plaintiff Psalmond alleged that
he was injured when he was struck in the back and shoulder by
another passenger who came down the slide prematurely. 44 He
and his wife sued the airline asserting state law claims of negli-
gence and gross negligence.45 Delta removed the action to the
U.S. District Court based on federal question jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331.46
The district court first considered the so-called well-pleaded
complaint rule, noting that "[a]s a general rule, a case arises
under federal law when it appears from the well-pleaded com-
plaint that federal law creates the cause of action or that resolu-
tion of the dispute requires interpretation of a substantial
federal issue. 47 Or, a state claim may be deemed to arise where
"complete preemption" is found such that federal regulation
"'so occupies a given field" that any claims arising in that field
"must . . . be characterized as federal in nature. '48 The court
went on to preliminarily note that the "plaintiffs do not assert
any federal claims in the complaint . . . [n]or do the asserted
claims raise any substantial federal issues," presaging, as it were,
the court's ultimate view of the merit of federal question
removal.49
The airline took the position that the state negligence claims
asserted in the complaint are completely preempted by the Act
as amended by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA)."o It argued
that the state negligence claims are subject to implied preemp-
tion, which extends to the entire field of aviation safety.5 As an
alternative to implied field preemption, the airline argued that
"emergency disembarkation procedures are related to an air-
line's core 'service' of providing safe transportation, and that
the asserted claims are thus expressly preempted by the ADA. 52





47 Id. at *2 (internal citation omitted).
48 Id. (quoting Dunlap v. G & L Holding Grp., Inc., 381 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th
Cir. 2004)) (internal citations omitted).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at *3.
52 Id. (emphasis added).
2015] 297
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The district court first concluded that implied preemption ex-
ists, but does not extend to matters unrelated to airline rates,
routes or services. 53 With regard to express preemption, the dis-
trict court made two points. First, the court looked to the deci-
sions of the Eleventh Circuit in Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc.
54
and the Fifth Circuit in Hodges v. Delta Airlines, InC.55 Those cases
"interpret[ ] the ADA's 'services' term to include all of the
'[contractual] features of air transportation' that are bargained
for by air carriers and their passengers and that Congress in-
tended to deregulate via the ADA, such as 'ticketing, boarding
procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage.' 56 Quot-
ing a decidedly arch passage in Branche, the district court ex-
plained, "airlines do not compete on the basis of likelihood of
personal injury ... and as such it does not undermine the pro-
competitive purpose of the ADA... to permit states to regulate
this aspect of air carrier operations.
57
Having concluded that neither implied field preemption nor
express preemption applies, the court in Psalmond noted "that
defendant has failed to acknowledge the distinction that the
Eleventh Circuit draws between the 'ordinary preemption' that
may provide an affirmative defense to a state law claim and the
4complete preemption' that allows for removal of a state claim
to federal court. '58 "Ordinary defensive preemption does not
furnish federal subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.... Complete preemption entirely transforms a state-law
claim into a federal claim, regardless of how the plaintiff framed
the legal issue in his complaint and thus does supply federal ju-
risdiction. ' 59 The court added that such complete preemption is
"rare," and that in any event, it has not been shown in this
instance.6 °
The court buttressed its decision by way of 49 U.S.C.
§ 41112(a), "which requires an air carrier to maintain an insur-
ance policy or self-insurance plan that is 'sufficient to pay ... for
bodily injury to, or death of, an individual or for loss of, or dam-
53 Id.
54 342 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003).
55 44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995).
56 Psalmond, 2014 WL 1232149, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
57 Id.
58 Id. at *5 (citing Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1261 (11th Cir.
2011)).




age to, property of others, resulting from the operation or main-
tenance of the aircraft.' ,,61 The court noted that " [ t] he Eleventh
Circuit has cited this provision as evidence that Congress did not
intend for the ADA to preempt state personal injury claims. 62
Despite its chilly reception to the defendant's preemption ar-
gument,63 the court held that "its asserted basis for removal was
not 'objectively unreasonable."' 64 Accordingly, the court found
that an award of fees and costs was not warranted under 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c).65
4. Silverwing at Sandpoint, LLC v. Bonner County
The subject matter of the Silverwing dispute concerned prop-
erty in proximity to the Sandpoint Airport in Sandpoint,
Idaho.66 In April 2006, the plaintiff purchased 18.1 acres of land
on the west side of the airport upon which it in intended to
design and construct a 45 unit planned unit development of
hangers for airplanes with optional second-floor residences. 67
The plaintiff claimed that, included with the purchase of land,
was a perpetual taxiway easement allowing it and the residents
of the proposed development to access the airport runway from
its property.68
On April 1, 2007, the plaintiff and Bonner County (the
County) entered into an agreement granting the plaintiff a per-
petual right of access to the airport in private aircraft from the
planned unit development property for a yearly access fee.69
The FAA indicated to the County that it had no objection to the
proposed right-of-access agreement so long as the agreement
was approved by the FAA.70 The plaintiff invested significant
sums on the development and on construction of the west taxi-
way, as well as marketing the development.71
61 Id. at *4.
62 Id. (citing Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1258 (lth Cir.
2003)).
63 The court directed that the action be remanded to the state court in which
it originally had been filed. Id. at *6.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Silverwing at Sandpoint, LLC v. Bonner County, No. 2:12-00287, 2014 WL





71 Id. at *2.
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However, problems arose. In December 2008, the FAA placed
the airport project in "noncompliance" status for three years;
the County subsequently implemented a "corrective action
plan" to bring the airport back into compliance.7 2 Even when
the FAA expressed increasing concerns regarding certain pro-
posed changes to the project design, the plaintiff claimed that
the County still represented that it would not have to relocate
the west taxiway.73
Yet, in 2011, the plaintiff alleges that the County, contrary to
prior representations, notified the plaintiff that it would be re-
quired to remove the west taxiway and relocate it 60 feet to the
west in order to comply with FAA standards."4 In December
2011, the County submitted an amended action plan to the FAA
depicting the relocation of the airport and the plaintiff's taxiway
to the west.75 The FAA and the County approved the corrective
action plan in October 2011.76 In February 2012, the FAA tenta-
tively placed the airport back into compliance while extinguish-
ing the plaintiff's perpetual easement rights.77
The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the County alleging,
among other causes of action, the breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing and promissory estoppel.78 The
County filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the
state law claims should be dismissed as a matter of law because
aviation safety and airport design standards are entirely pre-
empted by federal law.79 The County argued that its actions re-
garding the location of the runway were taken in compliance
with mandated federal statutes and FAA regulations concerning
airport safety.80 In response, the plaintiff asserted that federal
preemption did not extend to local decisions about siting or ex-
panding airports.81
The court found that the plaintiff's claim for the breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was preempted by







78 Id. at *3.
79 Id. at *6.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at *10.
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the latter, the court noted that the estoppel claim was based on
allegations that did not involve sufficient interference with fed-
eral laws and regulations; rather, it addressed supposed misrep-
resentations made by the County." That is, the promissory
estoppel claim centered around specific allegations involving
the County's alleged assertions to the plaintiff upon which the
plaintiff relied on when deciding to expend further money on
the project.8 4 As to the breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, the court found this claim was properly preempted
because it raised allegations that were based on the FAA's deter-
mination that the airport was not in compliance with regula-
tions as well as to the County's efforts to bring the airport back
in compliance with said regulations.85 The motion for summary
judgment was therefore granted as to the breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
8 6
5. Naples v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
In Naples v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., the plaintiff filed a lawsuit
alleging that Delta negligently failed in its duty to protect her
from any hidden or latent hazards on its airplane.8 7 Plaintiff evi-
dently tripped and fell on a luggage strap of another passenger's
bag during the boarding process on a Delta flight preparing to
depart to Flint, Michigan.88 Delta argued that the plaintiff had
"failed to set forth a federal standard of care and that the Fed-
eral Aviation Act and its corresponding regulations preempted
the field."89 Delta also argued "that even if the plaintiff had ar-
ticulated a federal standard of care, it did not breach any regula-
tions."9 ° Alternatively, it argued that even if a state standard of
care applied, Delta had not breached that standard; there was
insufficient evidence for the plaintiffs claim to proceed where
Delta did not cause the tripping hazard or have reason to know





87 Naples v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 13-11257, 2013 WL 6919717, at "1 (E.D.
Mich. Jan. 16, 2014).
88 Id. at *2.
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The court granted summary judgment for Delta.12 The court
sided with prior case law that held that ordinary field preemp-
tion applies to airline safety operations even while an airplane is
not in-flight such that any federal standard of care should pre-
empt any applicable state standards. As the court found that
ordinary preemption still allowed for state remedies, it contin-
ued its analysis using a federal standard of care and Michigan's
standard of care.94 As it related to the federal standard, it noted
that the plaintiffs injury occurred before the flight attendants'
duty (as defined in the regulations) to check the status of
stowed baggage arose.95 The court rejected the plaintiffs at-
tempt to impose an additional duty on Delta that would have
required it to have assured that the luggage was properly stowed
before the timeframe proscribed by the federal regulations. 96 In
regards to Michigan law, the court found that the strap which
caused the fall was "open and obvious" and thus plaintiff's claim
was barred as a matter of law.97 Under Michigan's common law
addressing a common carrier's duty to protect passengers from
conditions under the carrier's "control," the court found that
the presence of a thick strap in the aisle of an airplane while
passengers were finding their seats was neither a danger caused
by Delta nor a danger under Delta's control.9"
6. Wells v. Kentucky Airmotive, Inc.
Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit asserting nuisance and trespass claims
against a local airport board and various other businesses oper-
ating at the airport.99 The plaintiffs alleged that they suffered
damages as a result of aircraft operating at altitudes below 500
feet above their property, which was located 1,000 feet from the
end of one runway.' 00 Plaintiffs sought permanent injunctive re-
lief prohibiting the use of the first 500 feet of airspace above
their property based on their assertion of "exclusive control over
and the right to possess the property, upon which their home
sits, as well as the immediate reaches of the atmosphere envelop-
92 Id. at *9.
93 Id. at *5.
94 Id. at *6.
95 Id. at *6-7.
96 Id. at *7.
97 Id.
98 Id. at *8.
99 Wells v. Kentucky Airmotive, Inc., No. 2012-001894, 2014 WL 4049894, at *1
(Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2014).
100 Id. at *1.
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ing their home."'1 The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs'
claims and the plaintiffs filed an appeal.0 2
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued, in part, that their claims
were not preempted by federal aviation law and the relief they
sought did not conflict with applicable aviation regulations.'0
In contrast, the airport defendants contended that the plaintiffs'
complaint alleged causes of action based solely on the effects of
aircraft operation, a field clearly preempted by federal law.10 4
The defendants argued that "since the field is preempted, a
state court could not enter an order attempting to regulate air-
craft operations.
1 °15
The Kentucky Court of Appeals sided with the airport defend-
ants.1"6 The court acknowledged that "[t]he scheme of federal
regulation in these areas is sufficiently comprehensive to make it
reasonable to infer Congress has left no room for supplemen-
tary state regulation." 107 The court noted that if a trial court
were to grant plaintiffs any relief relating to the safe and proper
operation of an aircraft over their property, "that court would
be invading an area of law pervasively controlled and extensively
regulated by the federal government."108 The court affirmed the
dismissal and concluded that the plaintiffs' claims were "wholly
preempted, as a ruling in their favor would create 'an obstacle
to accomplishing federal objectives' relating to the safe opera-
tion of aircraft.10 9
B. THE MONTREAL CONVENTION
The Montreal Convention, formally titled the Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules of International Carriage by
Air," 0 was adopted in 1999 and intended to supplant certain
provisions of its predecessor, the Warsaw Convention. The Mon-
treal Convention attempts to establish uniformity of rules relat-




104 Id. at *4.
105 Id.




110 See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Car-
riage by Air, May 28, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45 1999 WL 33292734 (2000)
[hereinafter Montreal Convention].
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cargo. This year saw its share of interesting cases involving the
Montreal Convention, especially as it relates to what constitutes
a timely claim and the treaty's preemptive reach.
1. Narayanan v. British Airways
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Narayanan
v. British Airvays analyzed the plain language of Article 35(1) of
the Montreal Convention and held that a claim for damages for
death or bodily injury is untimely if it is not brought within two
years of the date of the aircraft's arrival at a destination regard-
less of if the claim actually accrues after that time period. 1
On December 26, 2008, Papanasam Narayanan boarded a
British Airways flight from Los Angeles, California to London,
England.1 12 At the time, Narayanan suffered from terminal lung
disease that required supplemental oxygen during the flight. 13
However, British Airways allegedly denied Narayanan access to
his oxygen during the flight." 4 On landing, he received medical
treatment, eventually returned to the United States in January
2009, and died on June 11, 2009."1
On March 7, 2011, Narayanan's widow and two adult children
filed a claim against British Airways alleging that the denial of
supplemental oxygen on the flight to London contributed to
Narayanan's death. 16 "British Airways removed the case to fed-
eral court and moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 12(b) (6).''  British Airways argued that the complaint
was time-barred under the Montreal Convention's two-year stat-
ute of limitations period detailed in Article 35(1) because the
London flight arrived or should have arrived on December 26,
2008, and the family did not file their complaint until March 7,
2011, three months after the limitations period ended."18 The
district court dismissed the complaint as untimely.'19 The family
appealed, arguing that the limitations period should have been








119 Id. at 1129.
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triggered on the day of Narayanan's death, when their wrongful
death claim began accruing pursuant to California law.120
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision while
scrutinizing the scope of Article 35(1) vis-A-vis California law.121
Looking at the plain language of the statute, the court held that
the plaintiffs' complaint was clearly untimely. 122 Under Articles
29 and 35(1) of the Convention, a claim for damages must be
filed within two years of the date the aircraft arrived or ought to
have arrived at its destination. 123 Therefore, even though
Narayanan's death occurred six months after the flight, the stat-
ute of limitations period for the wrongful death claim under the
Montreal Convention was triggered when the flight arrived in
London in December 2008.124 The court noted that both the
Montreal Convention and its predecessor, the Warsaw Conven-
tion, intended to extinguish a cause of action after fixed time
periods and there was no ambiguity within the terms of the
Montreal Convention that would have tolled the statute of limi-
tations until the date of Mr. Narayanan's death. 125
2. DeJoseph v. Continental Airlines, Inc.
Plaintiff brought a negligence claim for injuries suffered while
on a Continental Airlines flight stemming from the spillage of a
hot beverage. 126 The plaintiff brought suit in New Jersey state
court but Continental removed the case on federal jurisdiction
grounds by arguing that the negligence claims were subject to
the Montreal Convention, which provided the exclusive cause of
action and remedy for the claims. 127 Continental argued that
the exercise of federal jurisdiction was proper based on the doc-
trine of complete preemption that was, it argued, deemed to
apply when the preemptive force of a federal statute entirely dis-
places any state cause of action. 128
The court analyzed the distinction between complete preemp-
tion and conflict preemption in the context of the Conven-
120 Id. at 1128-29.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1129-30.
124 Id. at 1130.
125 Id. at 1131.
126 DeJoseph v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 595, 598 (D.NJ.
2014).
127 Id. at 597, 606.
128 Id. at 600 (quoting Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir.
1995)).
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tion.121 It detailed that there was a circuit split among federal
courts regarding the preemptive impact of the Convention and
cited one prominent U.S. Supreme Court decision which argua-
bly allowed, depending on the interpretation of the holding, the
Convention to either completely preempt state law claims or
preempt them subject to conflict preemption."3 That said, the
court noted that the Supreme Court had not expressed any une-
quivocal intention for the application of complete preemp-
tion.'3 1 Furthermore, the court examined Article 29 of the
Convention, which details the conditions and limits of liability
under which a claim falling within the Convention may be
brought, and noted that this provision appeared to expressly
contemplate claims being "brought under this Convention or in
contract or in tort or otherwise. ' 13 2 Influenced by this language
and the lack of a definitive ruling in favor of complete preemp-
tion, the court refused to exercise federal question jurisdiction
on the grounds of complete preemption and remanded the case
to state court.
133
3. Benjamin v. American Airlines, Inc.
Benjamin v. American Airlines, Inc. involved a family's travel
from Florida to Haiti, gone amiss.' 34 The mother and father flew
from Miami to Port-au-Prince, while the daughter was ticketed
for a trip from Jacksonville, Florida through Miami, and then on
to Port-au-Prince on the same flight as her parents.3 5 However,
upon her arrival in Miami, the daughter was informed that the
airline "had sold the seat to another person.' 3 6 The situation
allegedly deteriorated from there, as the family claimed to have
had a "humiliating" encounter with a rude ticket agent, who in-
sulted them.137 The family purchased a new ticket for the daugh-
ter to fly from Miami to Haiti, at considerable expense. 1 3 The
new ticket proved to be a standby, and the daughter remained
129 Id. at 602.
130 Id. at 602-03.
131 Id. at 604.
132 Id. at 603.
133 Id. at 604.
134 Benjamin v. American Airlines, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 3d 1309 (S.D. Ga. 2014).






in Miami for nearly two days before being seated on a flight to
Port-au-Prince.139
Her parents, meanwhile, allegedly had no word of or from
their daughter, whom they deemed "missing" and reported as
such to the authorities in both countries, before being reunited
by happenstance at the airport in Port-au-Prince.140 Making mat-
ters still worse, the family was on a mission of mercy to deliver
medication, which was partly thwarted.14 1 No refund was re-
ceived for the unused leg from Miami to Haiti. 142 And, both the
mother and daughter suffered physical ills due to the airline's
"'outrageous conduct" and its imposition of "needless
stress.' "1143
The plaintiffs filed suit in federal court asserting six claims for
relief: breach of contract; public accommodation discrimination
in violation of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866; violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1985 and the Civil Rights Act of 1871; intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress; and attorneys' fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988.144
Defendant airline moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 145 The defen-
dant "argued that the Montreal Convention 46 preempts the
plaintiffs' breach of contract claim."'147 The court noted, in a
case-rich discussion, the majority and minority positions sur-
rounding preemption of local law where a claim falls outside the
scope of a liability treaty such as the Montreal Convention.'48
That is to say, should such a treaty be given complete preemp-
tive force, or should "the preemptive effect on local law ... ex-
tend[ ] no further than the [treaty's] own substantive scope"?' 49
The court resolved the matter in line with the "majority ap-
proach," holding that, since the Montreal Convention does not
include breach of contract for nonperformance within its sub-
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1313-14.





146 Montreal Convention, supra note 110.
147 Benjamin, 32 F. Supp. 3d at 1314.
148 Id. at 1316.
149 Id. (quoting El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 158
(1999)).
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stantive scope, it does not preempt the claim arising out of the
failure of the airline to transport the daughter on her originally
ticketed flight out of Miami. 5 ' (The court noted that the Mon-
treal Convention would preempt delayed performance of a con-
tract, but not nonperformance.)15' The motion to dismiss the first
claim in the complaint, for breach of contract, was denied.', 2
Likewise, the civil rights claims survived the defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss, as the allegations are "largely based on the same
facts underlying the breach-of-contract claim, albeit supple-
mented by allegations of discrimination based on race and na-
tionality."' 53 The allegations did not fall within the scope of the
Montreal Convention.
54
The intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, how-
ever, was found to fall partly inside and partly outside the Mon-
treal Convention. 155 The allegations involving roughshod
customer service by the ticket agent and the purchase of a sec-
ond ticket for a trip already ticketed:
are related to the nonperformance of the original contract rather
than the delay in transporting the daughter under the second
contract. In contrast, the ... allegations [concerning the forced
two-day layover in Miami] have an intimate connection with the
delayed transportation of the daughter and therefore fall under Ar-
ticle 19[ ] [of the Montreal Convention's] purview. 1 5 1
The defendant proffered as a second source of preemption
the ADA. 157 Thus, the court considered whether the stated cause
of action (stemming from the rude conduct of the ticket agent)
is related to rates, routes, or services of an air carrier. 58 Looking
to the 1988 decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Smith v. Comair, Inc., the court noted, "'Suits stemming from
outrageous conduct on the part of an airline toward a passenger
will not be preempted under the ADA if the conduct too tenu-
ously relates or is unnecessary to an airline's services.'' ,,59The
court allowed for the possibility that the ticket agent's allegedly
150 Id.
15, Id. at 1317.
152 Id. at 1318.
153 Id. at 1319.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 1320.
156 Id. (emphasis added).
157 Id. at 1321.
158 Id.; see 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).




rude behavior was "maliciously motivated and unnecessary to
the airline's services."16 Thus, ADA preemption was found not
to apply; yet, the court went on to find that the Plaintiffs' allega-
tions fell short under applicable state law governing emotional
distress claims.1 6 1
4. Safa v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, Inc.
In 2014, federal courts revisited the definition of "accident" in
the context of the Montreal Convention and particularly as it
relates to passenger medical emergencies. 162 On November 12,
2011, the plaintiff in Safa v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft,
Inc. was scheduled to fly on a Lufthansa flight from Philadelphia
to Beirut, Lebanon with a layover in Frankfurt.'6 3 The plaintiff
boarded the flight in Philadelphia without issue.' 64 Approxi-
mately three hours before landing in Frankford, the plaintiff fell
to the ground complaining of chest pain.'65
The flight crew and on-board physicians treated the plaintiff
during the time between his initial complaints and the aircraft's
arrival in Frankfurt.'66 Relying on information provided by the
flight crew, the captain chose not to divert the aircraft for an
intermediate landing.167 When the aircraft landed in Frankfurt,
the plaintiff was placed in an ambulance to be transported to
the hospital. 66 While in the ambulance, the plaintiff suffered a
prolonged cardiac arrest requiring six shocks. 6 ' He later had
surgery to have a stent replaced and was placed on a ventilator
for a prolonged period of time.
170
The plaintiff commenced a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida, and the case was transferred
to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 171
The plaintiff sought damages under Article 17 of the Montreal
160 Id.
161 Id. at 1322-23.
162 Safa v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, Inc., No. 12-2950, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 120690 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2014).
163 Id. at *6.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at *7-8.
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Convention.7 2 After the close of discovery, the defendant
moved for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the complaint
in its entirety.'73 The defendant contended that the plaintiff's
medical episode onboard the flight did not constitute an "acci-
dent" under the Montreal Convention and that defendant did
not act negligently.174
The court acknowledged that there was law which supported
the argument that complications arising from a passenger's
medical condition are not "external" to the passenger and thus
are not considered "accidents" under the Montreal Conven-
tion.175 On the other hand, it also acknowledged that a flight
crew's unexpected and unusual response to a passenger's medi-
cal condition had been deemed in prior cases to be "external"
and thus could constitute an "accident" under the
Convention. 176
The court determined that the plaintiff had not pointed to
any crew member conduct which departed from Lufthansa's in-
ternal operating procedure regarding medical emergencies that
could be deemed "unexpected" or "unusual;" therefore, the
plaintiff's incident was not an accident under the Montreal Con-
vention.177 By contrast, the record made clear that the crew of
the Lufthansa flight followed all of its own applicable policy and
procedures with respect to medical emergencies when plaintiff
demonstrated a health scare.1 78 The court also noted that the
plaintiff's heart attack did not necessarily mandate an interme-
diate landing.179 The undisputed facts supported that the flight
crew complied with every relevant airline policy and procedure
including confirming with on-board physicians that the plain-
tiffs health issue was not life threatening. 180 As a result, the
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.8
172 Id.
173 Id. at *10-11.
174 Id.
175 Id. at *14-15.
176 Id. at *15.
177 Id. at *17.
178 Id.
179 Id. at *18.
180 Id. at *18-21.
18, Id. at *21.
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5. Ireland v. AMR Corp.
On December 22, 2009, the plaintiff was a passenger on an
American Airlines flight from Miami, Florida to Kingston, Ja-
maica when the aircraft was involved in a dramatic landing, i.e.,
it veered off the runway and crashed through a perimeter
fence. 18 2 The plaintiff claimed he suffered severe mental
anguish, fear of death, and other physical injuries. 183 As in the
Narayanan case, the court analyzed Article 35 of the Montreal
Convention which stated that a claimant's rights to damages
"shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within a period
of two years" from the date of the aircraft's arrival at its destina-
tion or the date on which the aircraft ought to have arrived. 184
Under the terms of Article 35, the plaintiff had until December
22, 2011, to bring a claim under the Montreal Convention. 
1 5
However, the plaintiff ultimately filed a lawsuit against Ameri-
can Airlines on December 21, 2012.'86 This was because Ameri-
can Airlines and its parent company filed for bankruptcy on
November 29, 2011, triggering the automatic stay protection
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code which
barred the commencement of a lawsuit during the pendency of
the stay.' 87 The plaintiff, relying on 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) of the
Bankruptcy Code, asserted that Article 35's two year limitation
period had been suspended by the automatic stay. 88 He con-
tended that because American Airlines had filed for bankruptcy
before the expiration of the limitations period, he had until
thirty days after he received notice of the expiration of the stay
to bring his claim and therefore his suit was timely filed.'8 9
American Airlines moved to dismiss the complaint as
untimely. '90
The court sided with American Airlines that the claims were
time barred.'' It found that the plaintiff had remedies to pre-
serve his claim during the pending bankruptcy. 192 For example,
182 Ireland v. AMR Corp., 20 F. Supp. 3d 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
183 Id. at 342.
184 Id. at 343.
185 Id. at 342-43.
186 Id. at 342.
187 Id. at 342-43.
188 Id. at 344.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 342.
192 Id. at 348.
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the plaintiff could have still filed a timely lawsuit within the two
year period where upon the lawsuit would have been abated un-
til the lifting of the stay.'93 The court also noted that plaintiff
could have applied to the bankruptcy court for a motion to lift
the stay for purposes of filing his lawsuit before the expiration of
the two year period. 19 4 The court concluded that there was no
section in the Bankruptcy Code which expressly tolled the stat-
ute of limitations in this context, and there was no potential un-
fairness to the plaintiff due to the stay.'95 Therefore, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed for
his failure to file suit within the two year period following the
crash. '96
C. THE WARSAW CONVENTION
1. In re Air Crash at Georgetown, Guyana, on July 30, 2011
The Warsaw Convention 9 7 was the centerpiece of In re Air
Crash at Georgetown, Guyana, on July 30, 2011.198 This personal
injury action arose out of the crash landing of a Caribbean Air-
lines flight in the Republic of Guyana in 2011.99 Caribbean Air-
lines moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(h) (3), "arguing that the court lacks subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the plaintiffs' claims." 21 More specifically, the airline
asserted that the Warsaw Convention governs the claims and
that "the treaty's forum provision deprives the court of subject
matter jurisdiction. ''20 1 Plaintiffs maintained that Guyana is not a
party to the Warsaw Convention.20 2
The court succinctly stated, "[t] he issue ... is whether Guyana
is a party to the Warsaw Convention.... If Guyana is a party to
the treaty, then the Warsaw Convention governs this case?and its





197 The Warsaw Convention is the common name for the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct.
12, 1929, 49 Stat 3000, 3014, T.S. No. 876 (entered into force in the United States
in 1934, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105).
198 In reAir Crash at Georgetown, Guyana, on July 30, 2011, 33 F. Supp. 3d 139
(E.D.N.Y. 2014).
'99 Id. at 142.





diction. ' 20 3 The issue is an artifact of Guyana's colonial past. The
one-time colony of the United Kingdom, British Guiana, as it
was known, did not gain independence until 1966, which meant
that for more than three decades after the United Kingdom
signed the Warsaw Convention, the Convention applied to then-
Guiana.20 4 Post-liberation, the issue was whether Guyana had af-
firmatively adopted the Warsaw Convention.20 5
Based on an interesting analysis of Guyana's sovereign history
since gaining independence, which no doubt reflected the rig-
orous historical research of all involved counsel, the court con-
cluded that Guyana is in fact not a party to the Warsaw
Convention and that the treaty is not the governing law of the
case. 206 The airline's motion to dismiss was denied. 20 7
D. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
1. Bochetto v. Piper Aircraft Co.
The lawsuit in Bochetto arose out of a September 15, 2009,
crash of a Model PA 34-2023 Seneca V Aircraft that was being
operated by a flight school in Portugal. 2 8 The aircraft was man-
ufactured by Piper Aircraft in Florida and was owned by two dif-
ferent American entities in 1998 and 2001 before it was
ultimately sold to a Belgium company that then leased it to the
flight school. 20 9 The three occupants of the aircraft, all of for-
eign citizenry, died in the crash.210
Three defendants filed ajoint motion to dismiss the action on
the grounds of forum non conveniens arguing that the litigation
was a "textbook case" for dismissal on the doctrine of forum non
conveniens because of the many relevant connections to Portu-
gal.21 ' The trial court accepted the defendants' arguments and
dismissed the action subject to a stipulation by the defendants
that could have allowed the matter to be re-filed in Portugal. 212
Plaintiffs appealed the trial court's dismissal contending that
it erroneously failed to give deference to their choice of forum
203 Id. at 142.
204 Id. at 144.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 153.
207 Id.
208 Bochetto v. Piper Aircraft, 94 A.3d 1044 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2014).
2 0 Id. at 1045.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 1047.
212 Id.
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and misapplied Pennsylvania law regarding the pertinent factors
that should have been considered in a forum non conveniens mo-
tion.213 The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the trial
court's failure to consider the litigation's connections to the
United States as a whole was an error.214 It also deemed defi-
cient the trial court's failure to discuss the pertinent public and
private interest factors that could have weighed in favor of the
plaintiffs' choice of forum instead of only focusing on those that
weighed against the choice of forum. 21 '5 Among the private in-
terest factors the Superior Court identified as weighing in sup-
port of the plaintiffs' choice of forum was evidence relating to
the design, manufacture and testing of the aircraft, which was
located in the United States, and evidence relating to the air-
craft's documentation of past maintenance, which was also lo-
cated in the United States. 2 6 Among the public interest factors
which were not considered was that none of the decedents,
plaintiffs, or defendants were Portuguese.21 7 As a result, the
court vacated the trial court's order dismissing the action and
remanded the case for a more comprehensive analysis of all rel-
evant forum non conveniens factors.218
The Bochetto case does not represent any reinterpretation of
existing forum non conveniens law in Pennsylvania. Rather, it is a
reminder that trial courts must conduct a complete and com-
prehensive analysis of all pertinent public and private interest
factors and weigh these factors accordingly.
E. CONTINENTAL CONNECTION FLIGHT 3407
1. In re Air Crash near Clarence Center, New York on
February 12, 2009
Decisions stemming from the notable Colgan Air crash con-
tinued in 2014. "On February 12, 2009 Continental Connection
Flight 3407 ("Flight 3407"), operated by Colgan [Air Inc. (Col-
gan)], crashed on approach to the Buffalo-Niagara Interna-
tional Airport. Forty-nine passengers and crew died in the crash
and there was one fatality on the ground. Also, two individuals
213 Id.
214 Id. at 1056.
215 Id. at 1055-56.
216 Id. at 1055.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 1056.
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on the ground were injured. '219 In a previous ruling, the court
held "that the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 [ and Federal Avia-
tion Regulations [] preempted all state standards of care. '"220
In this matter, the "plaintiffs move[d the court] for an order
imposing upon [Colgan] a federal general standard of care with
respect to their claims of negligent hiring, training, selection
and supervision. "221 "Colgan argue [d] that any direct claims of
liability against air carriers for negligent hiring, training and su-
pervision may only be proven by a showing that the carrier vio-
lated specific provisions of the [Act] or FARS. ' '2 2 2 Plaintiffs
moved the court to "recognize a federal general standard of
care which, if violated, would impose liability directly against
Colgan for its alleged negligent hiring, training and supervision
of the pilot and co-pilot of Flight 3407. '"223
Plaintiffs asserted that the general standard of care enunci-
ated in 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) governed their claims, providing
that "[n]o person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reck-
less manner so as to endanger the life or property of an-
other. '224 The court rejected this contention; "[g]iven the
absence of a clear and unequivocal statutory mandate or judicial
precedent," it refused to impose a federal general standard of
care upon the hiring, training and supervision of pilots. 225 The
court held that the proper standard of care must stem from the
"specificity of the FARS that delineate the requirements that
must, at a minimum, be satisfied in order for an air carrier to
properly hire and train its pilots. '226 Acknowledging the breadth
and scope of the regulatory scheme already controlling pilot hir-
ing and training, it rejected the plaintiffs' attempt to find an
even higher standard of care within the Act.227 The court held
that the standard of care is set by specific federal regulations
and there is no general federal standard of care as plaintiffs ar-
gued which governed hiring or training.228
219 In reAir Crash near Clarence Center, New York on February 12, 2009, 991





224 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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F. ASiANA FLIGHT 214
1. Lu v. Boeing Co.
In Lu v. Boeing Co., an Illinois district court addressed whether
there was removal jurisdiction in several related personal injury
cases arising from the crash of Asiana Airlines Flight 214 into a
seawall at San Francisco International Airport on July 6, 2013.229
Boeing removed the case to federal court on the basis of admi-
ralty jurisdiction and federal officer jurisdiction. 2 " The plain-
tiffs successfully remanded to state court, and Boeing filed a
motion for reconsideration.231
The central issue before the court was whether the tort actu-
ally occurred prior to the crash, such that the "injury became
inevitable" while the plane was still over water.232 Federal admi-
ralty jurisdiction over a tort claim requires a showing "that the
tort either occurred on navigable water or was caused by a vessel
on navigable water.1233 Flight 214 was flying over San Francisco
Bay as it approached the airport.23 4 The plane's rear landing
gear and tail hit the seawall and broke off, causing the plane to
skid out of control on the runway.235 In support of its motion,
Boeing underscored evidence and expert testimony that pur-
ported to show that the crash became inevitable while the plane
was still over water. 236
The court compared the circumstances of Flight 214 to two
prominent cases that considered similar questions concerning
the location of the tort where federal admiralty jurisdiction was
applicable.237 In one of those cases, the aircraft's vertical stabi-
lizer detached several minutes after takeoff while over Jamaica
Bay, leaving the aircraft incapable of flight and certain to
crash.23 8 In another case, the critical loss of tail rotor control
occurred over water, making it incapable of landing safely. 239
229 Lu v. Boeing Co., No. 13-7418, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50210 (N.D. I1. Apr.
11, 2014).
230 Id. at *5.
231 Id. at *4-5.
232 Id. at *10.
233 Id. at *9-10.
234 Id. at *4.
235 Id. at *5.
236 Id. at *6-9.
237 Id. at *15-16.
238 Id. at *10; see In re Air Crash at Belle Harbor, 02 MDL NO. 1448, 2006
U.S.Dist. LEXIS 27387 (S.D.N.Y May 9, 2006).
239 Lu, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50210 at *10; see Brown v. Eurocopter S.A., 38 F.
Supp. 2d 515 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
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The court did not agree, as Boeing had asserted, that Flight
214's accident was set in motion over navigable water unlike
these two cases where the flight was destined to crash and the
injury was certain while the aircraft was over water.240
In its motion, Boeing argued that while the plane was still
over water the aircraft's approach had already passed a point
where correction was not feasible.24 ' But the court found that
the plane almost landed safely on the runway and missed it by
only about five feet and that "[t] he aircraft was functional and
responsive up until the crash. ' 242 Along those lines, the court
also underscored that Boeing had assumed that the crash was
the only possible outcome when it was possible that the engines
could have responded with enough thrust to lift the plane a few
more feet above the runway and avoid the accident alto-
gether.24" The court noted that Boeing had impermissibly
worked "backwards" from the crash and made a false assump-
tion that the crash was at some point unavoidable.244 That
method was not appropriate here when the aircraft still had an
opportunity for a safe landing over the runway. 24 5 The court
found that Boeing's evidence did not persuade it that the tort
was complete before the airplane struck the seawall or that the
crash or resulting injuries were inevitable well before the crash
itself on the seawall. 246
Boeing also asserted federal officer jurisdiction because the
plaintiffs' tort claims challenged work performed by Boeing em-
ployees, who certified the aircraft's safety according to a highly
regulated federal process.2 4 7 In short, Boeing contended that
whenever airworthiness is challenged, certification is likewise
challenged. The court disagreed, finding that Boeing "has not
offered any authority for its idea that a lawsuit against an air-
plane manufacturer for product liability and negligence is the
same as a suit against the manufacturer's employees for negli-
240 Lu, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50210 at *15-17.
241 Id. at *6-8.
242 Id. at *13, *22.
243 Id. at *13-14.
244 Id. at *15-16.
245 Id.
246 Id. at *22.
247 Id. at *23.
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gent certification. "248 Boeing's motion for reconsideration was
therefore denied.249
G. MALAYSIA FLIGHT 370
1. Fatt v. The Boeing Company
As has been well documented, on March 8, 2014, Malaysian
Airlines Flight 370 disappeared en route from Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia to Beijing, China.250 To date, the bulk of the aircraft
has not been located, and all 239 passengers and crew onboard
are believed to be dead. 5'
Lee Khim Fatt, the husband of a deceased crew member,
Foong Wai Yueng, obtained an order in Illinois state court ap-
pointing him as a special administrator of Ms. Yueng's estate.252
On that same date, he filed a verified petition for discovery pur-
suant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224.253 Rule 224 "permits a
person to file an independent action for discovery for the lim-
ited purpose of ascertaining the identity of one who may be re-
sponsible 'in damages,"' and allows for an order which will
"limit discovery to the identification of responsible persons and
entities.'25
4
In his petition, Mr. Fatt alleged that the accident aircraft was
manufactured by Boeing Company and that it was operated by
Malaysian Airlines.2 5 He alleged that he reasonably believed
that he had a viable cause of action for negligence against addi-
tional unknown entities who proximately caused his wife's
death. 56 In addition, he asserted that Boeing was potentially in
possession of records and other information identifying individ-
uals and entities who owned, operated, leased, repaired, and
maintained the subject Boeing aircraft prior to and at the time
of the accident.257 Accordingly, he requested an order requiring
Boeing to provide him with documents identifying the names,
248 Id.
249 Id. Notably, Boeing filed a Notice of Appeal on April 15, 2014, appealing
the matter to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
250 Fatt v. Boeing Co., No. 1-14-1108, 2014 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2645, at *2




254 Id. at *8.
255 Id. at *2.




addresses, and telephone numbers of all known owners of the
aircraft from the date of the manufacturer to the present, sales
agreements, lease agreements, and entities that performed
maintenance or repair work.258 Additionally, he requested an or-
der for production of documents naming the identity of every
individual who provided the pilots and co-pilots with any train-
ing related to the subject aircraft and anyone who approved the
airworthiness of the accident aircraft. 259
With respect to Malaysian Airlines, Mr. Fatt requested an or-
der requiring the disclosure of documents identifuing persons
or entities in possession of information or documents pertaining
to the company's safety practices, any training of the subject
crew, the airline's physical and psychological evaluations of the
crew, a detailed cargo listing, and "squawk" sheets for the previ-
ous year.260
Without holding a hearing, the circuit court of Illinois sua
sponte issued an order finding the petition exceeded the scope
of allowable discovery as set forth in Rule 224.261 In dismissing
the petition, the court further noted that the law firm represent-
ing the petitioner had previously filed similar petitions on three
separate occasions (one which involved Flight 370 and two
others) 262 The court noted that all of those prior petitions were
dismissed as improper.263 The circuit court warned the law firm
that filed the petition that it would be subject to sanctions upon
the filing of any similar petitions that were clearly outside the
scope of Rule 224.264
On appeal, the petitioner contended that the court erred
both in dismissing the petition without a hearing as is required
pursuant to Rule 224, as well as on the merits since there ex-
isted, at the very least, a split in authority as to whether the dis-
covery petition should be granted where the identity of at least
one of the defendants is known. 2 65 Boeing countered that the
circuit court was within its right to dismiss the petition without a
258 Id.
259 Id. at *3-4.
260 Id. at *5.
261 Id.
262 Id. at *6.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id. at *7-8.
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hearing and requested the imposition of sanctions on the
petitioner.266
The appellate court held that the circuit court was without
authority to deny or grant the petition sua sponte without first
holding a hearing according to the Illinois rules.267 The court
noted that the procedural requirements of the rule were not
complex, i.e., "[a] hearing must be held before the court can
grant or deny a Rule 224 petition. ' 26 Accordingly, it reversed
and remanded the court's dismissal of the petition on procedu-
ral grounds.2 69 However, in doing so, it expressly reminded the
petitioner's attorneys that they were on notice of the trial court's
warning that going forward with any potentially frivolous discov-
ery petitions may subject them to sanctions. 270
H. GOVERNMENTAL LLABILIrY
1. Turturro v. United States of America, et al.
On May 22, 2008, student pilot Charles Angelina was con-
ducting pattern work at Northeast Philadelphia Airport with his
flight instructor Adam Braddock. 271 After performing a touch-
and-go on Runway 24, the local controller instructed the pilots,
who were operating a Grumman AA-1 C, to set up for left traffic
on intersecting Runway 33.272 While the aircraft was on "final"
during its second touch-and-go on Runway 33, an Agusta heli-
copter operated by Agusta Aerospace was hovering east of Run-
way 33 requesting permission to depart the airport in a westerly
direction. 273 The local controller instructed the Agusta helicop-
ter to momentarily hold its hover position.274 Soon after, the lo-
cal controller cleared the Agusta on course for a westerly
departure (specifically, northwesterly) while also indicating pre-
viously to the Agusta that the Grumman would be in a "left
downwind departure. "275
266 Id. at *8.
267 Id. at *10.
268 Id. at *9.
269 Id. at *10.
270 Id.
271 Turturro v. United States, et al., No. 10-2460 2014, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118044,
at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2014).
272 Id. at *6-7.
273 Id. at *7-8.
274 Id. at *8.
275 Id. at *8-9.
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During its subsequent climb out from Runway 33, the local
controller instructed the Grumman to "make right traffic. 276
The Grumman initiated its right turn at an altitude of 200-300
feet but then was seen climbing at an abnormally slow speed.277
It subsequently stalled and crashed into a nearby parking lot kill-
ing both pilots. 278 The Agusta helicopter was about 2,678 feet
away and traveling at a speed of 5 to 7 knots when the "make
right traffic" instruction was given.279 Upon seeing the Grum-
man turn right, the Agusta flight instructor (having not heard
the "make right traffic" instruction and surprised by the Grum-
man's right hand turn toward their aircraft) executed a "quick
stop" immediately halting the forward momentum of the
aircraft. 8
The estates of Mr. Braddock and Mr. Angelina filed separate
(and later consolidated) lawsuits against Agusta and the United
States of America (i.e. the Federal Aviation Administration) in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.28' The plaintiffs claimed
that the United States was negligent insomuch as the traffic con-
troller should have instructed the Grumman to make right traf-
fic "speed and altitude permitting. '2 2 Without that qualifying
language, the plaintiffs argued that the Grumman believed it
had to make the immediate turn at a critical phase of flight.28 3
After initially contending that the Grumman had experienced
wake vortices from either the Agusta or perhaps an earlier de-
parted business jet, the plaintiffs relied heavily on a "startle reac-
tion" theory.284 The plaintiffs claimed that the Grumman pilots
turned right in response to the controller's instruction and were
"startled" to view the westerly bound Agusta headed toward
them, which caused the student pilot to yank back on the con-
trols causing the crash.285 Plaintiffs claimed that the Agusta was
also at fault for contributing to this collision hazard by improp-
erly requesting a westerly departure.286
276 Id. at *9.
277 Id. at *10.
278 Id. at *13.
279 Id. at *12-13.
280 Id. at *12.
281 Id. at *2-3.
282 Id. at *39.
283 Id.
284 Id. at *49.
285 Id.
286 Id. at *35.
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Defendants filed summary judgment seeking to dismiss all
claims, and the court granted summary judgment dismissing the
complaint.287 The court found no prohibition on the control-
ler's manner of communication with the Grumman pilot during
its departure climb and rejected the argument that the "make
right traffic" communication as issued by the controller con-
veyed any sense of urgency. 288 In short, the controller did not
breach any duty of care to the decedents. 2 9 The court held that
the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the traffic controller's
action caused the Grumman to stall and crash. 290 Nor was there
any factual support that the Agusta's position or direction of
flight created a "startle reaction. '291 The court held that the
plaintiffs could not even establish that either of the Grumman
pilots ever perceived the Agusta.292 Furthermore, it found that
neither the aircraft controller's traffic instructions nor the de-
parture route of the Agusta created a verifiable collision hazard
or contributed to any hypothetical "startle" effect. 29 3
Plaintiffs have filed a notice of appeal appealing the case to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.294
2. Pellegrino v. United States of America
In Pellegrino, the plaintiff brought suit under the Federal Tort
Claims Act alleging property damage, false arrest and imprison-
ment, malicious prosecution, and civil conspiracy in connection
with an airport Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
security screening. 295 The United States has waived its sovereign
immunity in instances where false arrest and imprisonment, ma-
licious prosecution, and civil conspiracy claims are brought
against "investigative or law enforcement officers" of the federal
government, and "law enforcement officers" are defined as
those entitled to execute searches, seize evidence, or make ar-
287 Id. at *65.
288 Id. at *40-41.
289 Id. at *42.
290 Id. at *42-43.
291 Id. at *49, *52-53.
292 Id. at *54.
293 Id. at *36, *52-53.
294 Turturro v. United States, et al., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118004, appeal dock-
eted, No. 14-3834 (3d Cir. Sept. 11, 2014).
295 Pellegrino v. United States, No. 09-5505, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52468, at
*11 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2014).
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rests. 29 6 The court held that TSA officers who conduct airport
screenings do not fall within the law enforcement exception ar-
ticulated in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), particularly because this pro-
viso was enacted as a response to specific egregious behavior
during federal law enforcement raids and was not intended to
be expansive enough to apply to airport security screeners.297
Consequently, the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain these
claims and dismissed them.298
However, the court declined to dismiss the plaintiffs property
damage claim as precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). 299 The prop-
erty damage was unrelated to the false arrest and imprisonment
claims; rather, this claim arose from a TSA agent's actions dur-
ing the screening of the plaintiffs property, while the other
claims arose from different, separate activity that allegedly oc-
curred after the screening was complete."°
I. AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT
1. Air Wisconsin v. Hoeper
The defendant, a Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) em-
ployed by the plaintiff as a pilot, was required to become certi-
fied to fly a new aircraft, a task that he thrice failed.30 1 The
plaintiff agreed to give the defendant a fourth, final chance at
certification, during which he performed poorly and was ver-
bally abusive to his instructor.10 2 At the same time, the supervi-
sor reported the defendant's behavior to his supervisor, and the
defendant boarded a flight home.0 3 The plaintiffs leadership
then reviewed the incident and determined, based on the defen-
dant's outburst, his imminent termination, a history of assaults
by other disgruntled airline employees, and the defendant's sta-
tus as an FFDO, that the defendant may be armed and unsta-
ble.30 4 As a result, the plaintiff notified the TSA, advising that
296 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h); 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h); Pellegrino, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
52468, at *18.
297 Pellegrino, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52468, at *18.
298 Id. at *21.
299 Id. at *22.
300 Id.; Defendant's subsequent motion to dismiss the property damage claim
based on lack of evidence was also denied. Pellegrino v. United States, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 111942, at *32-34 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2014).
30, Air Wisconsin v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852, 858 (2014).
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 859.
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the defendant was "an FFDO who may be armed," that the air-
line was "concerned about his mental stability and the wherea-
bouts of his firearm," and that "an unstable pilot in the FFDO
program was terminated today. '30 5 In response, the TSA re-
moved the defendant from his flight, searched him, and ques-
tioned him about the location of his gun. 6 The defendant sued
for defamation, and the plaintiff moved for summary judgment,
alleging immunity under the Aviation and Transportation Se-
curity Act (ATSA) .307 The trial court denied summary judgment,
finding that whether the plaintiff made a disclosure to the TSA
about the defendant with actual knowledge that the disclosure
was "false, inaccurate, or misleading" or made "with reckless dis-
regard as to its truth or falsity" was a question for the jury.308 The
jury found in favor of the defendant, a result affirmed by the
Colorado Court of Appeals °.3 9 The Colorado Supreme Court
also affirmed, but held that the trial judge erred in submitting
the issue of ATSA immunity to the jury.3 10 Rather, the Colorado
Supreme Court reasoned, ATSA immunity is a question of law to
be determined by the trial court prior to trial. 1 ' Nonetheless,
the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, though the
defendant's conduct may have warranted a report to the TSA,
the plaintiffs statements "overstated the events to such a degree
that they were made with reckless disregard as to their truth or
falsity. '312
The Supreme Court heard the case to evaluate whether, in
determining ATSA immunity, the trial court was also required to
determine the material falsity of the statements.3 1 3 The Court
held that the trial court was required to determine that the de-
fendant's statements were materially false. 314 Congress pat-
terned the exception to ATSA immunity, the Court reasoned,
on the "actual malice" standard articulated in New York Times Co.




308 Id. at 859-60.




313 Id. at 861.
314 Id.
315 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
316 Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 861.
324
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
cause the actual malice standard does not encompass materially
true statements made recklessly, the Court held that ATSA im-
munity extended to materially true statements made
recklessly." 7
The Court then held that the Colorado Supreme Court's anal-
ysis of material falsity was erroneous, and found that the plaintiff
was entitled to ATSA immunity.318 The Court noted that a dis-
closure is "materially false" if a reasonable TSA officer would
consider the omission or misrepresentation important in deter-
mining how to respond to a situation.319 The Court found that a
reasonable TSA officer, if advised that the defendant was an
FFDO who was upset about losing his job, would have investi-
gated the whereabouts of Defendant's weapon. 320 This interpre-
tation, the Court reasoned, supported the purpose of ATSA
immunity, namely to encourage air carriers and their employees
to provide the TSA with prompt information about threats,
often in high-pressure situations.3 21 Further, the plaintiff's re-
port that the defendant had been terminated, even though the
defendant had not yet been fired, was also subject to immu-
nity.3 22 Though the defendant had not been terminated at the
time of the statement, the firing was all but imminent, and even
the defendant acknowledged that the final attempt to become
certified was "final" and provided at the plaintiffs discretion.323
In deciding how to react to this situation, the Court held, no
reasonable TSA officer would care if an upset, potentially armed
airline employee had just been terminated or knew that this ter-
mination was imminent. 24 Lastly, the Court held that the plain-
tiffs statement about the defendant's mental state fell under the
umbrella of ATSA immunity, even though these concerns may
have been phrased in a less inflammatory way. 2 5 Specifically,
the Court held that a statement that would otherwise qualify for
ATSA immunity should not lose that immunity because of a mi-
nor imprecision, as long as "the gist" of the statement was
accurate.326
317 Id. at 862.
318 Id. at 867.
319 Id. at 864.
320 Id. at 865.




325 Id. at 865-66.
326 Id. at 866.
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J. CONFLICT OF LAWS
1. In re Air Crash Near Rio Grande, Puerto Rico on
December 3, 2008
This case arose when an aircraft, transporting passengers both
domiciled in Ohio, crashed in Puerto Rico killing the passen-
gers.3 27 The pilot, domiciled in the U.S. Virgin Islands, was oper-
ating under Visual Flight Rules (VFR), which forbade flying into
clouds or areas of reduced visibility unless he obtained permis-
sion from air traffic control to do so. 32' The pilot did not advise
air traffic control of visibility problems until right before the
plane crashed. 29
The United States sought summary judgment with regard to
damages, alleging that, under the doctrine of lex loci delicti, the
law of the place of the tort applies; thus, under Puerto Rico law,
the plaintiffs' claim for lost future earnings was impermissi-
ble. " ' The plaintiffs countered that Puerto Rico had replaced
lex loci delicti with a "dominant contacts" approach and that the
court should apply Eleventh Circuit precedent, which required
the application of the law of "the least interested jurisdiction
with the least restrictive damages law," namely the law of Ohio
and the U.S. Virgin Islands (where the pilot and decedents
resided) .
Even if the "dominant contacts" approach applied in Puerto
Rico, the court found that Puerto Rico damages law applied.332
First, the fact that the plaintiffs were not Puerto Rico domiciliar-
ies did not outweigh Puerto Rico's interest in preventing air
crashes and ensuring reparations were made for wrongful
acts.3 3 Further, dominant contact also existed in Puerto Rico
because the plaintiffs alleged the accident was caused by air traf-
fic control in Puerto Rico and did not assert that the accident
location was fortuitous. 334 Lastly, the court rejected the applica-
tion of Eleventh Circuit law because the Federal Tort Claims Act
looked to the law of the state where the act occurred, and this
327 In re Air Crash Near Rio Grande, Puerto Rico on Dec. 3, 2008, No. 11-md-
2246-MARRA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89435, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jul. 1, 2014).
328 Id.
329 id.
330 Id. at *7, *13.
331 Id. at *13-14.
332 Id. at *14.
333 Id. at *15 (citing Bonn v. P.R. Int'l Airlines, Inc., 518 F.2d 89, 92 (1st Cir.
1975)).
34 Id. at *16.
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case was only before the Eleventh Circuit due to assignment by
the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation. 5
The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, arguing that the
court erred in not applying the Restatement (Second) of Con-
flict of Laws, which requires application of the law of the juris-
diction that affords the plaintiffs the greatest relief, namely
Ohio, as it had a more dominant connection to the case than
Puerto Rico and would provide the plaintiffs greater relief than
Puerto Rico law.336 The court disagreed." 7 First, the court re-
jected the "greatest relief' argument, finding that the Restate-
ment was not designed to favor one party over another or
provide a plaintiff with the largest potential recovery, but rather
was aimed at harmonizing interstate and international systems
of law.338 The court also found that Puerto Rico's connection to
this case was substantial enough to warrant the application of its
law.39 Specifically, the Restatement notes that the local law of
the state where the injury occurred determines the parties'
rights and liabilities, and another state's law only applies if that
other state had a "more significant relationship" to the incident
and parties. 4 The court held that Puerto Rico was the place of
injury, place of the conduct causing the injury, and the center of
the parties' relationship because the plaintiffs alleged that the
accident occurred in Puerto Rico, with a plane en route to a
destination in Puerto Rico, due to the actions of air traffic con-
trol in Puerto Rico.341 The Restatement, and the court, gave no
weight to Ohio as being the domicile of most of the decedents
and the site of the survivors' pecuniary loss because the place of
injury is not the place where a death results in pecuniary loss to
the decedents' beneficiaries.342
335 Id.
336 In re Air Crash Near Rio Grande, Puerto Rico on Dec. 3, 2008, No. 11-md-
2246-MARRA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115841 at *7-9 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2014).
337 Id. at *9.
338 Id.
339 Id. at *10.
340 Id. at *9.
341 Id. at *10.
342 Id. at *11.
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K. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
1. Walden v. Fiore
In Walden v. Fiore,343 a local police officer, Anthony Walden,
was working at the Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson Airport as a depu-
tized agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
(These events occurred in 2006.) His duties there involved in-
vestigative stops and other law enforcement functions in support
of the DEA's mission.344 Officer Walden encountered a couple
who were traveling en route to Las Vegas, Nevada, from San
Juan, Puerto Rico. Having received notification from DEA
agents in San Juan that the couple was traveling with close to
$97,000 in cash, Officer Walden approached the couple at their
Atlanta departure gate. Apparently unsatisfied with the trav-
elers' explanations concerning their activities ("professional
gamblers" who were carrying their "gambling bank"), a drug-
sniffing dog was used to conduct a sniff test, whereafter Officer
Walden seized the funds and informed the couple that the
funds would be returned if they could "prove a legitimate source
for the cash. '34 5 They departed for Las Vegas, and the next day
Officer Walden was contacted by their attorney, seeking their
funds.346
Officer Walden helped draft an affidavit to show probable
cause for forfeiture of the funds, which was provided to the of-
fice of the United States Attorney in Georgia. 47 Ultimately, no
forfeiture complaint was filed, and the DEA returned the funds
six months after seizure. The couple alleged that the affidavit
was "false and misleading because [Officer Walden] had misrep-
resented the encounter at the airport and omitted exculpatory
information regarding the lack of drug evidence and the legiti-
mate source of the funds. ' 348 They filed suit against Officer
Walden in the United States District Court for the District of
Nevada, seeking money damages for violation of their Fourth
Amendment rights under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents.3 49
343 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).




348 Id. at 1119-20.
349 Id. (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971)).
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The district court granted Officer Walden's motion to dismiss
on grounds that personal jurisdiction was lacking. The search
and seizure of cash in Georgia was insufficient as a basis upon
which to exercise personal jurisdiction in Nevada.150 The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that Officer
Walden's submission of the affidavit was "'expressly aimed"' at
Nevada "with knowledge that it would affect persons with a 'sig-
nificant connection' to Nevada. '3 51 Also noting that the delay in
returning the seized funds caused "'foreseeable harm"' in Ne-
vada, the appellate court found that the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction was reasonable. 52
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. In a par-
ticularly instructive clarification of minimum contacts, the Court
explained that the "minimum contacts analysis looks to the de-
fendant's contact with the forum State itself, not the defendant's
contacts with persons who reside there. 3 53 "[T] he relationship
must arise out of contacts that the 'defendant himself creates
with the forum State .... Due process limits on the State's adju-
dicative authority principally protect the liberty of the nonresi-
dent defendant-not the convenience of plaintiffs or third
parties. ' -3 54 " [T] he plaintiff cannot be the only link between the
defendant and the forum. Rather, it is the defendant's conduct
that must form the necessary connection with the forum State
that is the basis for its jurisdiction over him. 355
Turning to the record, the Court concluded, "Petitioner
never traveled to, conducted activities within, contacted anyone
in, or sent anything or anyone to Nevada. In short, when viewed
through the proper lens-whether the defendant's actions con-
nect him to the forum-petitioner formed no jurisdictionally rel-
evant contacts with Nevada. '3 56 "Petitioner's relevant conduct
occurred entirely in Georgia, and the mere fact that his conduct
affected plaintiffs with connections to the forum State does not
suffice to authorize jurisdiction. ' '1 5 7
35o Id. at 1120.
351 Id. (quoting Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558, 581 (9th Cir. 2011)).
352 Id. (citing Fiore, 688 F.3d at 582, 585).
353 Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122.
354 Id. (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
355 Id.
356 Id. at 1124.
357 Id. at 1125.
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2. Martinez v. Aero Caribbean
An airplane designed by defendant ATR and owned by vari-
ous defendants (the Cuban defendants) crashed, killing all pas-
sengers and prompting a wrongful death and negligence suit.3 58
ATR moved to dismiss the complaint before the Cuban defend-
ants were sued, and the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California granted the motion, but only as to ATR 59
The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit, but
their claims against the Cuban defendants remained pending
before the district court. 36 The court concluded that the plain-
tiffs' appeal was premature because the district court's order
granting ATR's motion to dismiss was not an appealable final
judgment.3 61 Specifically, the court noted that it had 'jurisdic-
tion over appeals from final judgments that dispose of all claims
with respect to all parties. 362 Though the court recognized that
an exception to this rule applies when an action is dismissed as
to all defendants who have been served and only unserved de-
fendants remain, the court cautioned that this exception does
not apply "where no final judgment is entered and it is clear
from the course of proceedings that further adjudication is con-
templated." 63 The district court's course of conduct, namely en-
tering final judgment with respect to ATR and not with respect
to the Cuban defendants and setting a deadline for the plaintiffs
to move for default judgment against the Cuban defendants,
suggested that the plaintiffs were continuing their case against
the Cuban defendants, and the order dismissing the plaintiffs'
claims against ATR was not intended to finally dispose of the
whole case. 64 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
because the judgment in the pending district court case was not
final, it did not have jurisdiction. 65
358 Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 577 Fed. Appx. 682, 682 (9th Cir. 2014).
359 Id. at 682-83.
360 Id. at 683.
361 Id.
362 Id. (citing Dream Games of Ariz., Inc. v. PC Onsite, 561 F.3d 983, 987 (9th
Cir. 2009)).
363 Id. (citing Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d
861, 872 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis omitted)).
364 Id.
365 Id. at 684.
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3. Central Virginia Aviation, Inc. v. N. American Flight
Services, Inc.
Plaintiff, a Virginia corporation with its principal place of bus-
iness in Virginia, and Defendant, a New York corporation with
its principal place of business in New York, were both engaged
in the buying, selling, and leasing of aircraft.366 Defendant
placed an airplane up for auction on eBay, and Plaintiff won the
auction, bidding $125,100.367 Plaintiff's president inspected the
airplane at Defendant's location in New York, and Plaintiff
made a deposit toward the purchase in an escrow account. 6
Two days after the inspection, Defendant entered into a con-
tract for the sale of that airplane to Plaintiffs customer (the
third party) for $195,000.369 Defendant then advised Plaintiff
that, after the auction ended, Defendant received two other of-
fers, and Plaintiff had two days to pay the increased price or the
airplane would be sold "to the next guy in line."37 Plaintiff al-
leged that, after Defendant learned of the contract of sale be-
tween Plaintiff and the third party, Defendant breached the
contract with Plaintiff in order to sell the airplane directly to the
third party, removing Defendant as the middleman. 7 Defen-
dant brought suit for breach of contract, tortious interference
with the contract between Plaintiff and the third party, and tor-
tious interference with business expectancy.37 2 Defendant
moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b) (2) due to lack of personal jurisdiction.373
The court considered whether it could assume jurisdiction
over Defendant, a New York corporation, under Virginia's long-
arm statute, Va. Code § 8:01-328.1(A), which confers jurisdic-
tion over "nonresidents who engage in some purposeful activity
in Virginia, to the extent permissible under the Due Process
Clause" of the U.S. Constitution.374
Analyzing Defendant's contacts with Virginia under the long-
arm statute, the court was tasked with determining whether








373 Id. at 628.
374 Id. at 628-29.
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Plaintiff had made a prima facie case that each of its claims
arose out of Defendant's "[c] ausing tortious injury by an act or
omission" in Virginia. 375 Plaintiff alleged that "Defendant's con-
tacts with Virginia were not random, fortuitous, or attenuated,
but rather were intentional and targeted toward Virginia .... "376
The court rejected this argument because Plaintiff failed to al-
lege that Defendant caused "tortious injury by an act or omis-
sion" while Defendant was in Virginia.377 Indeed, Plaintiffs
complaint did not allege a single act that Defendant performed
in Virginia; the only transaction mentioned in the complaint
was the eBay auction.3 7' There was no allegation that the auc-
tion was directed at Virginia; rather, the auction was available to
anyone with an Internet connection. 79 The auctioned airplane
was located in New York, Defendant accepted the winning bid
from New York, and Plaintiff s president traveled to New York to
inspect the plane.8 The Complaint did not allege that the third
party was a Virginia resident and did not allege that Defendant
had direct contact with the third party.8 Consequently, there
was no specific tortious conduct alleged that linked Defendant
to Virginia. 82 Instead, the complaint alleged that, after learning
about the contract between Plaintiff and the third party, Defen-
dant breached its contract with Plaintiff so as to allow the plane
to be sold directly to the third party, without referring to
forum.3 8 3
Next, the court held that personal jurisdiction may not satisfy
due process. 4 Under the Due Process Clause, personal jurisdic-
tion could be exercised over a non-resident defendant only if
the defendant has "certain minimum contacts" with the forum
state "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 38 5 In
making this determination, the court considered (1) the extent
to which Defendant "purposefully avail [ed] itself of the privilege
of conducting activities" in Virginia; (2) whether Plaintiff's




379 Id. at 629-30.





385 Id. (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
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claims arose out of those activities directed at Virginia; and (3)
"whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be 'consti-
tutionally reasonable.' 
3 6
Because Plaintiff failed to allege a single fact to show Defen-
dant had any contact with Virginia, and no part of Defendant's
course of conduct occurred in Virginia, insufficient contacts ex-
isted to confer personal jurisdiction.8 7 The only action that oc-
curred in Virginia-Plaintiff's alleged injury-was insufficient to
support the exercise of jurisdiction.388 The court concluded that
Defendant's actions in New York did not create sufficient con-
tacts with Virginia simply because Defendant allegedly directed
its conduct at Plaintiff, whom Defendant knew had connections
in Virginia. 8 9 Such reasoning would improperly attribute Plain-
tiffs Virginia connections to Defendant.3 90 Accordingly, the
court found that Defendant did not have minimum contacts
with Virginia because it did not "'purposefully avail' itself of the
privilege of conducting activities" in Virginia, and thus, the
court did not consider steps two or three of the due process
inquiry. 9' The court held that attaching personal jurisdiction to
Defendant would violate due process and dismissed the
complaint. 9 2
4. SD Holdings, LLC v. Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association,
Inc.
The plaintiff (SD) initiated a patent infringement action
against the defendant (the Association), and the Association
moved to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction. 93 The
complaint asserted that the District Court of Oregon had per-
sonal jurisdiction over the Association under the Oregon long-
arm statute, Oregon Rule of Civil Procedure 4L, based on Asso-
ciation's activities in Oregon. 94
Determining if personal jurisdiction exists over an out-of-state
defendant involves two inquiries: (1) whether the forum state's
386 Id. (citing ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707,
712 (4th Cir. 2002)).






393 SD Holdings, LLC v. Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n, Inc., No. 13-01296,
2014 WL 3667881, at *1 (D. Or. July 22, 2014); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
394 SD Holdings, 2014 WL 3667881, at *2.
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long-arm statute permits the assertion of jurisdiction and (2)
whether asserting such jurisdiction violates federal due process;
that is, whether a defendant, through conduct and connection
with the forum state, purposefully availed itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum state to such a degree
that the defendant invokes the benefits and protections of the
forum's laws and should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there. 95 There are two types of personal jurisdiction: gen-
eral jurisdiction, which exists if the defendant's contacts with
the forum are sufficiently continuous and systematic to establish
a physical presence in the forum, and specific jurisdiction,
which exists if defendant purposefully directed its activities at
residents of the forum and the claims asserted in the litigation
arise out of or are related to the defendant's forum-related
activities.395
The court first analyzed the Association's contacts with Ore-
gon.397 The Association was a NewJersey corporation headquar-
tered in Maryland. 98 The Association had members in Oregon,
but had no physical presence in Oregon, was not registered to
conduct business in Oregon, and had no registered agents, em-
ployees, or sales representatives in Oregon. 99 SD argued that
the Association had sufficient continuous and systematic con-
tacts with Oregon because the Association presented seminars
in Oregon, was licensed with the Oregon Insurance Division,
solicited pilots to sell its products in Oregon, had Oregon citi-
zens as dues-paying members, advertised and provided services
to Oregon citizens, and was available in Oregon by means of its
website, which enabled users to create an account and listed a
number of flying clubs in Oregon.4 0 Further, SD alleged that
the Association's advertising representative made numerous
trips to Oregon to solicit advertising dollars from SD, the Associ-
ation's president visited SD's aviation club in Oregon to pro-
mote the Association's services, and the Association e-mailed an
395 Id. at *3. The court also acknowledged that federal law governed the ques-
tion of whether a district court had personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a
patent suit.
396 Id. at *4 (citing LSI Indus. v Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375




400 Id. at *2-3, *5.
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SD shareholder (Stenberg), offering a free trial membership
and other solicitations.40
The court held the Association's contacts with Oregon were
insufficient to confer general jurisdiction.40 2 With regard to the
website, the ability of Oregon residents to access a passive web-
site available to customers throughout the country was insuffi-
cient, standing alone, to establish a persistent course of conduct
in a state necessary for general jurisdiction, particularly because
the Association's website was not the "highly interactive, transac-
tion-oriented" type sufficient to support general long-arm juris-
diction.40 3 Further, the "unilateral" actions of individuals
accessing the website, creating accounts, and forwarding pay-
ment to the Association via the internet did not constitute con-
duct within Oregon, and the actions of members obtaining
information from the Association through the website did not
establish that the Association had a persistent course of conduct
within Oregon.40 4 The Association's e-mail and postal mail solici-
tations also did not support general jurisdiction.4 5 If these were
received as part of a nationwide advertising campaigndirected at
residents of all fifty states, rather than just the forum state, this
was not tantamount to the intentional contact with the forum
required to create general jurisdiction. 40 6 Further, if the solicita-
tions targeted just a single individual, this was insufficient to cre-
ate a continuous and systematic relationship with Oregon.40 7 In
addition, SD and the Association representatives' advertising
and promotional meeting, as well as attendance by SD's repre-
sentatives at an Association event in Oregon, were more prop-
erly characterized as occasional and isolated activities rather
than regular and continuous business contacts that created a
physical presence within the state.40 8
The court held that specific jurisdiction also did not exist.40 9
The Association's website, available to all U.S. residents, was not
purposefully directed at Oregon residents and did not support
specific jurisdiction.410 Even assuming the Association's personal
401 Id. at *3.
402 Id. at *6-7.
403 Id. at *6.
404 Id.
405 Id. at *7.
406 Id. (citation omitted).
407 Id.
408 Id.
409 Id. at *8.
410 Id. at *7.
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and written contacts with SD's representatives were purposefully
directed at Oregon, the plaintiff "failed to demonstrate that" its
patent infringement claims "arose out of or [were] related to
the Association's contacts with" SD in Oregon.4 ' "The Associa-
tion's presence in Oregon to solicit advertising, promote prod-
ucts, [and] provide training [was] in no way related to" SD's
claim that the Association's flight planning products infringed
on SD's patents, particularly because the flight planners were
only accessed through the Association's website.41 2 The defen-
dant's only conduct with Oregon that may have been related to
the patent claims was a meeting between Stenberg and an Asso-
ciation representative "to discuss the development of an online
flight planner" that occurred "two to three years before the pat-
ents were issued," but there was "no evidence to link this meet-
ing with the Association's subsequent offering of the allegedly
infringing . . .planning products. '413 Consequently, the action
was dismissed because SD "failed to meet its burden of demon-
strating that" either the Association had continuous and system-
atic general business contacts within Oregon or that its claims
arose "out of or were related to the Association's contacts"
within Oregon.41 4
5. Clay v. AIG Aerospace Ins. Services, Inc.
This suit arose out of an airplane crash, caused when "a vac-
uum pump within the [planes'] engine failed in flight," result-
ing in the deaths of the pilot and his passenger. 1 5 The engine
and vacuum pump (the components) had several buyers and
sellers after manufacture, and before the crash, including the
Defendants Ruhe Sales, Inc., Bob Ruhe, and Eric Ruhe (the
Ruhe Defendants). The Ohio residents purchased the destroyed
aircraft, including the components, from Defendant AIG via an
Internet auction, and then traveled to Florida to transport the
aircraft to Ohio.416 Once back in Ohio, the Ruhe Defendants
removed the components and sold and shipped them to Defen-
dant Air-Tec, Inc. (Air-Tec) in Florida.417 Eventually the compo-
411 Id.
412 Id. at *8.
413 Id.
414 Id. at *7-8.
415 Clay v. AIG Aerospace Ins. Serv., Inc., No. 6:14-cv-235-Orl-40GJK, 2014 WL
6469422, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2014).




nents ended up in the decedents' aircraft. The plaintiffs
initiated claims for negligence, strict liability, and breach of war-
ranty based on these events.418 The Ruhe Defendants moved to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, contending "they [had]
not invoked the jurisdiction of Florida's long-arm statute and
would have their due process rights violated [if] Florida [were]
to exercise personal jurisdiction over them."4 9
The court noted that personal jurisdiction is obtained if plain-
tiffs allege "sufficient facts to subject the [Ruhe Defendants] to
[Florida's] long-arm statute" and if due process is satisfied be-
cause the defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with
Florida and the exercise of jurisdiction comported with fair play
and justice.42 ' According to Florida's long-arm statute, a non-
resident is subject to "specific jurisdiction by performing any of
the acts enumerated by the ... statute," and is subject to "gen-
eral jurisdiction by 'engag[ing] in substantial and not isolated
activity within [the] state, whether such activity is wholly inter-
state, intrastate, or otherwise ... whether or not the [litigation]
arises from that activity.' "421
"Plaintiffs allege [d] that the Ruhe Defendants ... submitted
themselves to ... specific jurisdiction" by "(1) operating, engag-
ing in, or carrying on a business venture in Florida, (2) commit-
ting a tortious act in Florida, (3) causing injury to persons or
property by conducting certain solicitation or service activities
within Florida, and (4) breaching a contract by failing to per-
form acts required to be performed in Florida. '422 "Regardless
of which enumerated act through which a plaintiff asserts spe-
cific jurisdiction," the court reasoned, "the complaint must al-
lege a cause of action 'arising from' that enumerated act in
Florida," and "the phrase 'arising from' requires that the place
of injury be [in] Florida. 4 23 The court found that the plaintiffs'
injuries "did not accrue in Florida. 4 24 Further, the plaintiffs
"did not incur injuries until the fatal plane crash," which oc-
curred later, after the Ruhe Defendants bought and sold the
418 Id.
419 Id. at *8.
420 Id.
421 Id. at *9 (citing Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2) (2014)).
422 Id.
423 Id. (citing Fla Stat. § 48.193(1) (a); Hollingsworth v. Iwerks Entm't, Inc., 947
F. Supp. 473, 478 (M.D. Fla. 1996)).
424 Id.
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components. 25 "Because [the] crash occurred in Texas[,] not
Florida," the court declined to exercise specific jurisdiction over
the Ruhe Defendants.
426
The plaintiffs also alleged the Ruhe Defendants were subject
to general jurisdiction "by engaging in 'substantial and not iso-
lated activity' within [Florida]," construed as "'continuous and
systematic business contact' [within] the state. 427 The court
noted that a non-resident submitted to "general jurisdiction
where he 'purposely avails [himself] of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within [Florida], thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its law,' ,4 28 but such "purposeful availment"
did not attach where a defendant's contacts were "'random,'
'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated.' ,4 29 The court found "[t]he Ruhe
Defendants' activity within Florida [was] limited. '430 The Ruhe
corporate defendant was an Ohio corporation headquartered in
Ohio, Eric Ruhe was a California resident, and they had never
been domiciled, "conducted or solicited business, owned prop-
erty, maintained bank accounts, received mail, or engaged in
any other meaningful business contact [with] Florida. '43 ' The
Ruhe Defendants' "only contacts with Florida involved the origi-
nal purchase of the" components from AIG in Florida, "and the
subsequent sale of same to Air-Tec," a Florida defendant.4 32
When the Ruhe Defendants purchased the components, "Eric
Ruhe entered Florida for the sole purpose of' transporting the
components back to Ohio, and when the Ruhe Defendants sold
the components, "Eric Ruhe responded to an Internet advertise-
ment seeking similar airplane engines and negotiated a sale of
the" components over the telephone.4 33 "Air-Tec then hired a
trucking company to travel to Ohio, pick up the" components,
and bring the items to Air-Tec in Florida. 4 Because these were
the extent of the Ruhe Defendants' contacts with Florida, "the
[c]ourt [could not] find that the Ruhe Defendants engaged in
425 Id.
426 Id.
427 Id. at *10 (quoting Autonation, Inc. v. Whitlock, 276 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1262
(S.D. Fla. 2003)).
428 Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75 (1985)).









'continuous and systematic business contact' with Florida. '43 5
The trip to Florida was a "random, isolated event," since the
Rhue Defendants' "next contact with Florida did not occur for
another six years," when they sold the components.4 Similarly,
the sale of the components to a Florida party was insufficient to
confer jurisdiction "because the Ruhe Defendants did not inten-
tionally seek out a Florida resident to whom they would make
the sale;" rather, "they merely responded to an Internet adver-
tisement that happened to be published by a Florida resi-
dent." '4 3 7 Lastly, the "Ruhe Defendants did not cause [the
components] to enter Florida; they simply allowed a Florida resi-
dent [to] pick up" the purchased items. 43 8 "Consequently, the
Ruhe Defendants [had] not submitted [to] general jurisdic-
tion. '439 The court granted the motion to dismiss because the
Ruhe Defendants were not "reached by Florida's long-arm stat-
ute under either specific or general jurisdiction."4 40
L. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
1. Huerta v. Pirker
In a year filled with prominent aviation news, among the most
intriguing story lines has been (and still remains) the emer-
gence of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS, or in the vernacular,
drones). The technology has been available and in use for many
decades, but recent advances in both micro-computing and pro-
pulsion, among other areas, have seen UAS enter the public
consciousness and public skies as never before. In 2014, daily
headlines announced the ambitions (and frustrations) of a wide-
range of constituencies, from newsgathering organizations, to
real estate brokers, and of course hobbyists, ready to deploy the
latest generation of UAS technology for fun and profit. Holding
back progress, however-and the author shares this observation
with the greatest respect for the FAA-is a federal regulatory
framework that is simply not ready for the mass deployment of
small, swift, inexpensive commercial aircraft under the control
of unlicensed pilots.
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For the time being, until the FAA promulgates new regula-
tions, operators must comply with a body of regulations devel-
oped long ago and with little, if any, contemplation of the
current state of the art of UAS.
Enter Raphael Pirker, a Swiss citizen who in 2013 was the sub-
ject of an FAA Order of Assessment, imposing a civil penalty in
the amount of $10,000 for his operation of a Ritewing Zephyr
powered glider aircraft in the vicinity of the University of Vir-
ginia in 2011.441 Pirker had equipped the device for use with
photographic and video equipment, for which he was to be
compensated.4 42
Pirker appealed the Assessment, which served as the govern-
ment's complaint, and moved to dismiss.443 The FAA alleged
that Pirker carelessly or recklessly operated the UAS in violation
of 14 C.F.R. Part 91, § 91.13(a), which provides that "[n]o per-
son may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so
as to endanger the life or property of another. ' 444 Pirker argued
that his drone was a hobby aircraft and not an "aircraft" within
the meaning of 14 C.F.R. Part 1, § 1.1. 445 Pirker further argued
that there is no "valid rule for application of FAR regulatory au-
thority over model aircraft flight operations. '446 The FAA sup-
ported its position with reference to the word "device," which
appears in both the Code of Federal Regulations and the U.S.
Code in the context of "aircraft," thus incorporating among
other things model aircraft. 447
The ALJ was persuaded that Pirker's drone qualified as a
"model aircraft," and that the FAA lacked regulatory and en-
forcement authority over such a device. 448 The ALJ found that
the FAA's contention that a model aircraft is an "aircraft,"
is diminished on observation that FAA historically has not re-
quired model aircraft operators to comply with requirements of
FAR Part 21, Section 21.171 et seq and FAR Part 47, Section 47.3,




444 Id. at *1, n.3 (quoting 14 C.F.R 91.13(a) (2014)).
445 Id. at *1. "14 C.F.R. Part 1, [§] 1.1 states as the FAR definition of the term
'Aircraft' a 'device that is used or intended to be used for flight in the air."; id.
(quoting 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2014)). "Part 91, § 91.1 states that Part, 'prescribes rules
governing operation of aircraft."' Id. (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 91.1(a)).
446 Id. at *1.
447 Id. at *1-2.
448 Id. at *3.
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which require Airworthiness and Registration Certification for an
aircraft. The reasonable inference is not that FAA has overlooked
the requirements, but, rather that FAA has distinguished model
aircraft as a class excluded from the regulatory and statutory
definitions.44
Further, the ALJ found no direct authority in the body of FAA
regulations or policy concerning UAS operations . 5 And taking
into consideration the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of
2012, the ALJ observed that this Act tasked the FAA "to develop
a plan for integration of civil UAS" and to publish "a final rule
on small UAS. ' '451 Had the legislators been reacting to an ex-
isting body of rules or regulations regulating small UAS, includ-
ing model aircraft, reasoned the ALJ, "the 2012 Act would have
called for action to repeal, amend, or modify the existing rules
or regulations, and not require a date for issuance of a final
rule.1
4 52
Pirker's motion to dismiss was granted, and the Order of As-
sessment was vacated,453 thereby, at least in theory, freeing the
skies for virtually all manner of unregulated small UAS activity.
The FAA appealed, though, and while the UAS community in
2014 awaited a new decision, the FAA continued to process ap-
plications for licenses to engage in commercial UAS
operations.454
In an order issued November 18, 2014, the NTSB reversed the
ALJ's decision in its entirety.455 The NTSB focused on two ques-
tions:456 First, whether Pirker's UAS qualifies as an "aircraft"
within the ambit of the FAA's enabling statute.4 5 7 Second,
whether the Pirker device is subject to 14 C.F.R. § 91.13.458 The
NTSB found in favor of the FAA on both issues.459
449 Id. at *2.
450 Id. at *3.
451 Id. at *4 (quoting FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-95, § 332(a), 126 Stat. 72 (2014)).
452 Id. at *4.
453 Id. at *5.
454 Huerta v. Pirker, No. CP-217, 2014 WL 6440411, at *1 (N.T.S.B. Nov. 18,
2014).
455 Id.
456 Opinion and Order at 4, Huerta v. Pirker, No. EA-5730 (N.T.S.B. Nov. 18,
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The NTSB first found that the definition of "aircraft" includes
"'any' 'device' that is 'used for flight.' ",460 With regard to the
FAA's prior treatment of model airplanes and other small air-
craft, the NTSB explained that the agency's forbearance from
regulating these devices does not limit its statutory authority to
do so.461 The NTSB also validated the Administrator's applica-
tion of 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) to UAS as a reasonable interpreta-
tion of the regulation.462 The matter was remanded to the ALJ
for further proceedings consistent with the decision of the
NTSB.463 On January 22, 2015, an Amended Order of Assess-
ment announced a settlement agreement whereby Pirker agreed
to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $1,100.464 He did not
admit to any allegation of wrongdoing. 46
5
While Pirker has been something of a structural beam support-
ing the FAA's efforts to maintain law and order out on the wild
UAS frontier, its role as such is likely to be short-lived, as the
FAA's much anticipated UAS Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) is expected in the near future. Meanwhile, a number of
commercial UAS enthusiasts have filed petitions for exemption
with the FAA to determine whether a given UAS operation can
be conducted safely under the current regulations.466 At present
time, the FAA continues to issue exemptions in sufficient num-
ber, and for a wide enough range of applications, that one can
fairly perceive a laboratory of on-going UAS experiments availa-
ble for the FAA to analyze while it contemplates its forthcoming
NPRM.
M. EXPERT TESTIMONY
1. Harman v. Honeywell International, Inc.
Harman v. Honeywell International, Inc.4 67 arose out of a single-
engine airplane accident involving a father and son that oc-
curred just outside of Chesterfield, Virginia.4 68 The estates filed
460 Id. at *6.
461 Id. at *7.
462 Id. at *8.
463 Id. at *4.
464 Pirker, Docket No. 2012EA210019 (FAA Jan. 22, 2015).
465 Id.
466 E. Tazewell Ellett & Patrick R. Rizzi, Three More FAA Exemptions for Commer-
cial Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 3, 2015), www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?y=27f5 1 c4e-d8c248fc-be6768cc 1 3f.
467 758 S.E.2d 515 (Va. 2014).
4- Id. at 518.
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suit against Honeywell International, Inc. alleging at trial a
claim for breach of warranty (other claims were previously dis-
missed) .469 The estates claimed "that the defective design of the
Honeywell autopilot system allowed microscopic debris to enter
... the gear systems. . . causing the plane to become uncontrol-
lable.."470 Honeywell argued that the pilot was inexperienced
which caused him to experience "spatial disorientation" under
heavy cloud cover.471
At trial, Honeywell introduced into evidence a crash investiga-
tion report prepared after the accident by Mooney Airplane
Company. 47 2 Mooney manufactured the accident aircraft.47" In
addition, Honeywell introduced testimony from two lay wit-
nesses, William Abel and Thomas Norman, who were the dece-
dent-father's flight instructor and co-owner of the Mooney
plane, respectively. 474 Honeywell used their collective testimony
to prove that the father-decedent lacked sufficient experience
and proper judgment to fly the aircraft, particularly in less than
optimal weather conditions. 475 Notably, Mr. Abel testified that
the decision to fly in the weather conditions that existed made
the pilot's judgment questionable.47 6 Mr. Norman testified "that
the Mooney plane was faster, more powerful, more complex,
and more difficult to maneuver than" a typical Cessna plane.4 7 7
The jury returned a verdict for Honeywell. 478 The estates ap-
pealed, contesting the admissibility of the supposed improper
opinion testimony of Abel and Norman and the admissibility of
the Mooney report, and moved for a new trial.479 The circuit
court denied that motion.480 Plaintiffs appealed to the Virginia
Supreme Court.48
First, the court addressed the Mooney crash investigation re-
port which was admitted under the "published treatise" category
469 Id.
470 Id.
471 Id. at 519.
472 Id.
473 Id.
474 Id. at 522-23.
475 Id.
476 Id. at 522.
477 Id. at 523.
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under the hearsay exception.8 2 The report focused on the posi-
tion of a 'jackscrew," a component in the autopilot system,
which the plaintiffs alleged caused the plane to take off in a
nose down take-off trim setting.483 The court held that the
Mooney report was erroneously admitted into evidence because
it was not the type of authoritative literature allowed by Virginia
law.48 4 First, the report lacked trustworthiness and was not "es-
tablished as reliable authority" by Honeywell's expert because
he could not say that similar investigation reports are common
for experts to rely on in the field.48  The court noted that
learned treatises usually "have sufficient indicia of trustworthi-
ness because their authors have no bias ... and are aware that
their work will be read and evaluated by others. 4 86 This report,
which was prepared for litigation, "was not subjected to peer re-
view or public scrutiny, and it was not written primarily for pro-
fessionals with the reputation of the writer at stake. ' 48 7 Of even
more significance, Mooney was a defendant in the case at the
time the report was prepared. 48 8 The Virginia Supreme Court
also found that the admission of the report was not harmless
error because it contained conclusions which went to the "heart
of the case" and otherwise opined on issues not addressed by
other evidence.489 Based on the report alone, the court found
basis to reverse the circuit court's ruling and remand for a new
trial.490
The court also addressed the lay witness testimony offered by
Mr. Abel and Mr. Norman.491 Citing Virginia authority, the
Court explained that lay witness testimony is admissible if "it is
reasonably based upon the personal experience or observations
of the witness and will aid the trier of fact in understanding the
witness's perceptions. '492 The court held that Mr. Abel's opinion
about the pilot's judgment was inadmissible and an impermissi-
482 Id. at 520.
483 Id. at 520-23.
484 Id. at 521-22.
485 Id. at 521 (quoting Va. Code. Ann. § 8.01-401.1 (West 2014)).
486 Id.
487 Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez, 588 F.3d 301, 312 (6th Cir. 2009)).
488 Id.
489 Id. at 521-22.
490 Id. at 522.
491 Id. at 522-23.
492 Id. at 523 (quoting Va. Sup. Ct. R. 2:701).
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ble assessment of the pilot's potential comparative
negligence.493
However, the court deemed Mr. Norman's testimony admissi-
ble because "it did not address [the pilot's] judgment or flying
abilities." '494 Mr. Norman's testimony regarding the difference
between the Mooney plane and a Cessna plane used by the pilot
during training was necessary to inform the jury about the dif-
ference in capabilities between the two aircraft.495 This testi-
mony was especially relevant because it illuminated on the
pilot's ability to handle the Mooney plane on the day of the
accident.496
III. CONCLUSION
In the year ahead, one can expect continued development of
all of the more frequently litigated issues. Indeed, a comparison
of each year's "Recent Developments" article, going back a num-
ber of years, supports this prophecy. But there is much that
awaits beyond the same-old same-old. As the UAS revolution ex-
pands, there would appear to be abundant unexplored territory
on the legal frontier, from common law tort and trespass, to reg-
ulatory compliance, to privacy. Drones will elevate many of our
terrestrial issues to the skies. Cyber technology, including hack-
ing497 and abuse of social media,498 will continue to emerge as
an acute challenge for the entire aviation community, from hob-
byists to airlines. And, of course, the tension between security
and privacy, at our airports and in our skies, will remain a chal-
lenge for our legislators, law enforcement, courts, and for
ourselves.
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